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A￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. In the ﬁrst part of this paper, we elicit time preferences by using the exper-
imental and econometric methods of Benhabib-Bisin-Schotter (2006). We follow the matching
task procedure on money-time pairs with real rewards. Among the model speciﬁcations we use,
the one with exponential discounting and quasi hyperbolic component of present bias appears
to be the best model ﬁtting the data. Unlike Benhabib et al., the present bias in the form of a
ﬁxed cost is not supported strongly by the data. In the second part of the paper, we test the
theory of behavior of time-inconsistent agents in a long run project based on the quasi hyperbolic
speciﬁcation of O’donoghue and Rabin (2005) and Akin (2004). The preferences elicited in the
ﬁrst part are used to predict the behavior of agents in the long run project and categorize them
based on their types. We ﬁnd that the theory captures most of the subjects’ observed behavior
and helps understanding their types. We also ﬁnd that some of the observations are compati-
ble with alternative models, including sign eﬀect, the preference for improving sequences, and
anticipatory utility models.
KEY WORDS: eliciting time preferences, hyperbolic discounting, experiment, long run
projects
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1. I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Consider an agent who is engaged in a long-run project that pays oﬀ only if completed in a certain
time interval. The agent’s problem is to allocate the time needed to complete the project eﬃciently,
i.e., to ﬁnd the allocation that maximizes his payoﬀ given his preferences and the time constraint.
Examples include an architect working on a drawing, a professor writing a paper, working on a
referee report, or preparing teaching materials, a student doing a homework, etc. The following out-
comes (some of them overlap) may emerge out of these situations; last minute ﬁnish ups, scattered
completion of parts, early completion, and incomplete projects for which some eﬀort has already
been expended.
Not all the outcomes above are eﬃcient in terms of planning or implementation. It would not,
for instance, be eﬃcient to start a project, invest the time and eﬀort into it, and then leave it
unﬁnished. However, we regularly observe such outcomes around us and even in our personal lives.
Are they simply mistakes? Or is there any rationale or explanation for such behavior? Behavioral
economic research on intertemporal decision making and self control might oﬀer us some clues
to answer these questions. Time inconsistencies leading to ineﬃcient outcomes can be observed
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if people have strong preferences for immediate gratiﬁcation. These systematic biases appearing
as reversal of preferences can be modeled by imposing declining discount rates on intertemporal
valuations of future payoﬀs1. Among such models, hyperbolic and quasi hyperbolic discounting
models are commonly utilized.
Given the diﬃculties of ﬁnding ﬁeld data to test for agents’ time preferences, estimating these
models by using experimental methods emerges as a natural approach. Unlike the existing litera-
ture, which attempts to elicit the time preferences only, we take it one step further and investigate,
both theoretically and experimentally, how players whose preferences have been elicited behave in
a long run project. Therefore, there are two main objectives in this paper; to elicit preferences of
the subjects, and to observe and explain their allocation patterns (investment schedules) in a multi
period project.
There is a large literature on how to elicit preferences both in Psychology and Economics.
Frederick-Loewenstein-O’Donoghue (2002) oﬀers a review of a wide variety of research done in this
area. In a recent paper, Benhabib-Bisin-Schotter, 2006, (from now on BBS) studies this problem by
carefully taking into account the weaknesses of the existing literature. They estimate the parameters
of the discount functions with a new econometric approach that follows a matching task procedure
on money-time pairs with real rewards. Exponential, hyperbolic and quasi hyperbolic discounting
frameworks are all embedded in this speciﬁcation. In addition, they incorporate a present bias in
the form of a ﬁxed cost into their speciﬁcation that turns out to be the best in terms of ﬁtting
their data. In the ﬁrst part of our paper, we follow their methodology with a few small diﬀerences.
We ﬁnd that even though the data do not seem to support solely one model or the other, among
the model speciﬁcations we use, the model with exponential discounting and quasi hyperbolic
component of present bias appears to be the best one ﬁtting the data. In contrast to BBS, our
data does not support present bias in the form of a ﬁxed cost. Overall, we ﬁnd it diﬃcult to reach
general conclusions about which approach is the best in terms of compatibility with the observed
choices. Subjects display diverse choices, and diﬀerent models seem to ﬁt the observed behavior of
diﬀerent subjects.
An incomplete project is an undesirable outcome but an incomplete project on which some
eﬀort has already been spent is even worse. There is a rapidly growing literature on individual
decision making with time-inconsistent preferences and economic applications to understand this
type of behavior2. In most of these studies, it is assumed that the tasks or projects that the
agents are involved in have only one stage, i.e., they are one shot tasks or projects. However, time
inconsistency may arise not only in cases where there is a one stage task to be completed in one of
the T > 1 periods, but also in cases where the task includes n > 1 stages to be completed in T > n
periods3. This is the case in most of the real world tasks such as studying for an exam, ﬁnishing a
paper, earning a certiﬁcate or a degree, and learning to play an instrument. These are all long-run
projects that are fairly ﬂexible in terms of allocating eﬀort over multiple time periods, and theyAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS 3
often have to be completed given the cost of not completing them. The real-life observations of
such experiences as incomplete projects that seem contrary to the intuition and the theoretical
interpretations make this issue worthwhile to investigate. The time-inconsistency literature may
help us understand why these kinds of behavior may arise and develop new incentive mechanisms
to deal with these ineﬃciencies.
There is a limited theoretical and experimental work examining behavior of economic agents
engaging in a long run project4. In this paper, we design an experiment in which we ﬁrst elicit
subjects’ preferences and then ask them to work on a long run project. Subjects determine the
time allocation for a two hour costly task among three periods with a delayed payment scheme.
We develop a theory that has a predictive power over the subjects’ allocations based on their
elicited preferences. Moreover, in addition to the quasi hyperbolic discounting, we ﬁnd support for
alternative approaches, namely sign eﬀect, the preference for improving sequences and anticipatory
utility model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a discounting framework
in general and oﬀers a formal model of behavior in long run projects based on quasi hyperbolic
discounting. Section 3 presents the experimental design in detail. The methodology used for the
analysis of the data is discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents the results from the experiment.
Section 6 discusses the limitations and alternative approaches. Section 7 concludes.
2. D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿ H)*+￿￿￿,￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿ ￿￿ L￿￿(-R￿￿ P￿￿-+￿￿￿
Economic decision makers are often faced with problems involving trade-oﬀs between current and
future payoﬀs. Discounted utility theory oﬀers a formal analysis of these trade-oﬀs. It postulates
that the payoﬀs earned later in the future are less valued than the ones earned relatively early
because of such reasons as the uncertainty about the availability and the magnitude of future
payoﬀs, future payoﬀs being more abstract than the current or closer ones, and the possibility of
dying before the realization of the payoﬀ. It also suggests that the objective of the economic agents
facing intertemporal decision problems is to maximize the sum of the discounted utilities over time.
The current payoﬀs enter the utility function without any discounting while the future payoﬀs enter
the utility function in a discounted manner. To evaluate the future payoﬀ y, we use the discount
function d(t), hence the discounted utility of payoﬀ y earned at time t would be yd(t). Because
of diminishing values of future payoﬀs, the discount function is assumed to be decreasing in time,
d￿(t) < 0.
In this paper, we will be interested in monetary payoﬀs. Money-time pairs are represented as
(y,t) where y is the amount of money in dollar terms and t is the date at which y is earned (t days
from now on.) The discount function that is commonly used is the exponential discounting where
d(t) = e−rt and it is usually written as d(t) = δt where δ = e−r is the discount factor and r is the
discount rate.AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS 4










dt is the derivative of d(t) with respect to time t. For exponential discounting, the
discount rate is constant and given by −
d￿(t)
d(t) = r = −ln(δ). For hyperbolic discounting, d(t) = 1
1+rt




Decreasing discount rate means that the discount function declines at a faster rate in the short
run than in the long run. Quasi hyperbolic discounting due to Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson
(1997) is another kind of discounting that is non-exponential and exhibits decreasing discount
rates. It is a discrete-time discount function represented as {1, βδ, βδ2, βδ3,...}. According to this
speciﬁcation, the discount rate between the current period and the next period is
1−βδ
βδ . However,
per period discount rate between any two future periods is
βδt−βδt+1
βδt+1 = 1−δ




βδ . It reﬂects a present bias for β < 1 because it has the feature that there is a
sharp drop in valuation of all future payoﬀs in the sense that for even δ = 1, any delayed payoﬀ y
is worth at most βy.
BBS introduces a new form of present bias called ﬁxed cost in the sense that a ﬁxed cost is
attached to any delayed payoﬀ independent of the amount. As a result, the discounted utility of
payoﬀ y earned at time t now would be yd(t) − b where b is the ﬁxed cost.
The systematic biases reﬂected as preference reversals (or dynamic inconsistency) documented
by the experimental studies can be explained by decreasing discount rates. In this sense, quasi
hyperbolic and hyperbolic discounting exhibiting decreasing discount rates are compatible with
these biases. In this paper, we, ﬁrst elicit the parameters of the discount function for each subject
via experimental techniques and then assess the compatibility of the elicited preferences with the
observed behavior of the subjects during a multi-period project.
The elicited preferences give us clues as to how each subject might behave in a multi-period
project. In addition, depending on the types of the agents5, the prediction for the subjects’ behavior
may change. The hyperbolic agents in long-run projects are investigated in a recent study by
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005). The authors examine procrastination on multi-stage projects.
They show that procrastination can be observed not only at the beginning of projects but also in
carrying on with the projects that have already been started. This may also lead to cases where
naive procrastinators may start a project, put some eﬀort into it, but never ﬁnish it. They also
ﬁnd that procrastination is more likely when the eﬀort is allocated more unequally across periods
and when the cost of eﬀort is higher towards the end, in which case agents are more likely to start
but not ﬁnish a project.
The paper by Akin (2004) examines the case where an agent plays a self investment game in
which he has to complete a long run project or task. The paper generalizes the two period model of
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across periods. Under this assumption, Akin (2004) shows that the exponential type completes the
investment stage immediately, the sophisticated type has a cyclical completion behavior and the
naive type either invests immediately or postpones until the deadline. It is also shown that when
a bonus scheme is added, naive procrastinators have to be compensated in an increasing manner
to continue to invest and a higher compensation is needed for the agents with a higher degree of
present bias.
Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) oﬀer experimental evidence on the interaction among procras-
tination, deadlines and performance of people when they face a sequence of tasks. They ﬁnd that
people are willing to self-impose deadlines, and this enhances their performance but not up to the
optimal level. They also ﬁnd some evidence for partial awareness of self-control problems. Fischer
(2001) takes a similar approach to ours and explains how time-inconsistency problems induce severe
procrastination. Considering a classical intertemporal utility maximization model with work and
leisure as the arguments, Fischer examines a model where the agent has to allocate eﬀort when a
ﬁxed amount of work has to be completed by a deadline. She shows that procrastination can arise
from a utility maximizing behavior in a dynamically consistent way. However, it requires very high
discount rates to generate serious procrastination and it cannot explain undesired procrastination.
The model that we present here is similar to the one in O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005) and
Akin (2004). We generalize the analysis of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005) to include three periods.
Unlike Akin (2004), we do not assume homogeneous costs across periods. The model we develop
here will form the basis of the game that the subjects played in our experiment.
2.1. Model. An agent has a costly project to complete within a certain period of time. The
agent has the choice of when and how to complete, or not to complete the project. The project
is a long term project in the sense that the agent has to invest in at least two diﬀerent periods to
complete it. The project cannot be completed in only one period because of the time and eﬀort
constraints. Completion of the project results in a ﬁxed payoﬀ. The payoﬀ, v, is earned one period
after the completion period.
For simplicity, we assume that the project must be completed in at most three periods. The
agent has to distribute the required time to complete the project among these three periods to
maximize his net payoﬀ given his preferences.
Players’ preferences are as follows: the player may be time-consistent exponential agent having
the sequence of discount factors:
￿
1, δ, δ2, δ3,...
￿
or he may be naive or sophisticated hyperbolic
both having the following sequence of discount factors:
￿
1, βδ, βδ2, βδ3,...
￿
. Here, δ is the
standard time-consistent impatience factor where δ ∈ (0,1) and β is the time-inconsistent preference
for immediate gratiﬁcation or the self-control problem of the agent where β ∈ (0,1). Let ￿ β be the
agent’s belief about his future self-control problems- his beliefs about what his taste for immediate
gratiﬁcation, β, will be in all future periods. A sophisticated person knows exactly what his future
self-control problems will be, therefore has perceptions ￿ β = β. A naive person believes he will notAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS 6
have any self-control problems in the future, therefore has perceptions ￿ β = 1. In this part, we will
be referring to quasi hyperbolic discounting whenever we use the term hyperbolic discounting.
Let C represent the total cost that needs to be incurred in order to complete the project6 and
let c denote the maximum cost that can be incurred in a given period. We will assume C ∈ (c, 2c].
If we call c1, c2 and c3 as the cost incurred in periods 1, 2 and 3, respectively, then c1 ≤ c,
c2 ≤ c, c3 ≤ c and c1+c2+c3 ≤ C. If c1+c2+c3 = C, a ﬁxed payoﬀ v is earned, if c1+c2+c3 < C,
the project fails to be completed generating a zero payoﬀ.
2.2. Timing of The Game. In period 0, the agent learns about the project, the allocation
restrictions of the cost and the payoﬀ. He then plans how much cost to incur in the following
periods. This planning of the project is important because depending on the preferences of the
agent, the plan may turn out to be time-consistent, i.e., the plan and the actual investment behavior
are the same, or it may turn out to be time-inconsistent, i.e., the plan and the actual investment
behavior are not the same.
In period 1, the agent has two choices. One is to do nothing because either postponing is
optimal or the project is not worth starting. The other is to choose 0 < c1 ≤ c and incur this cost
with the expectation of ﬁnishing the project in the future.
In period 2, the agent has two choices again. If he incurred c1 in the last period, he can ﬁnish
the project by investing the rest C − c1 (if c1 ≥ C − c). Alternatively, he can do nothing (if a
project is not worth starting in period 1, it is not worth starting in period 2 either). The agent
may also want to invest some, but not all of the remaining cost C − c1. If he did not invest in the
previous period, he either invests C −c ≤ c1 ≤ c or gives up on the project completely (given that
the agent did not invest in the ﬁrst period, if he does not invest in period 2 either, he will not be
able to ﬁnish the project.)
In period 3, if the agent ﬁnished the project in the previous period, he gets the payoﬀ. If he
incurred the cost c1 and c2 (C − c ≤ c1 + c2 < C) in the previous periods, he can either invest the
rest in period 3, ﬁnish the project and get the payoﬀ in the following period, or he may choose not
to ﬁnish the project even though he has already incurred c1 +c2. We will examine the convex cost
case later but for now, we assume the cost is linear in time and the following remark states that
under the linear cost, for all parameter values, the set of optimal allocations is very small.
Remark 1. In period 1, for the agent with hyperbolic (β ∈ (0,1)) or exponential discounting
(β = 1), it is optimal to incur the maximum cost, c, at the ﬁnishing stage. To see this, consider
the fact that the agent tries to maximize the following discounted utility by choosing c1 and c2,
P∗(c1, c2) = max
c1,c2
P(c1, c2) = max{0,−c1 − βδc2 − βδ2(C − c1 − c2) + βδ3v} if c1 + c2 ￿= C
P∗(c1, c2) = max
c1,c2
P(c1, c2) = max{0,−c1 − βδc2 + βδ2v} if c1 + c2 = CAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS 7
It is clear that for any given β, δ, C and v values, if c2 ￿= C−c1, then since P(c1, c2) is decreasing
both in c1 and c2, the following are true
−c1 −βδc2−βδ2(C −c1−c2)+βδ3v
c1→0
< −βδc2−βδ2(C −c2)+βδ3v < −βδ(C −c)−βδ2c+βδ3v
−c1 − βδc2 − βδ2(C − c1 − c2) + βδ3v
c2→0
< −c1 − βδ2(C − c1) + βδ3v < −(C − c) − βδ2c + βδ3v
however,
−βδ(C − c) − βδ2c + βδ3v > −(C − c) − βδ2c + βδ3v
On the other hand, if c2 = C − c1, then by the same reasoning above, the agent should choose
c1 = C − c. Then the above problem can be written as follows:
P∗(c1, c2) = max{0, − (C − c) − βδc + βδ2v, − βδ(C − c) − βδ2c + βδ3v}
Depending on the parameter values (as long as both expressions are greater than zero), one of them
will give us the maximizing allocation as either c1 = 0 and c2 = C − c or c1 = C − c and c2 = c.
2.3. Formal Analysis. The investment schedule (c1, c2, c3; t) means that the agent invests c1
in period 1, c2 in period 2, c3 in period 3 and gets the payoﬀ at time t. For example, (c1, C−c1, 0; 3)
means that the agent invests c1 at t = 1, invests the rest at t = 2 and gets the payoﬀ at t = 3.
c1 + c2 + c3 ≤ C
If c1 + c2 + c3 = C, then t = {
3, if c1 + c2 = C
4, if c1 + c3 = C, c2 + c3 = C or ci ￿= 0, i = 1,2,3
If c1 + c2 + c3 < C, then we write (c1, c2, c3;−)
Exponential Agent. The exponential agent is time-consistent in the sense that he plans to
follow an investment schedule and he follows it as such. His plan of ﬁnishing the project or not
doing it depends on whether the project is worth doing regardless of the period from which he
looks ahead. If condition 1 below is satisﬁed, then the exponential agent investment schedule will
be (C − c, c, 0;3):
−(C − c) − δc + δ2v ≥ 0 (1)
If the above condition is not satisﬁed, then the exponential agent will not start the project. So,
since for the exponential agent β = 1, postponing is not optimal.
Naive Hyperbolic Agent. The naive hyperbolic agent may not be able to follow his original
plan in the future because of unawareness of his own preference for immediate gratiﬁcation. In
period 0, if the condition 1 is satisﬁed, then he plans to ﬁnish the project in the future. In period
1, he will compare the expressions in condition 2 below:
−(C − c) − βδc + βδ2v
￿ ￿￿ ￿
(C−c, c, 0;3)
≥ −βδ(C − c) − βδ2c + βδ3v
￿ ￿￿ ￿
(0,C−c, c;4)
≥ 0 (2)AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS 8
If condition 2 is satisﬁed, then the agent starts doing the project. If condition 3 below is also
satisﬁed, then the naive agent ﬁnishes the project in the second period and gets the payoﬀ in
period 3 (C − c, c, 0;3) :
βδv − c ≥ βδ2v − βδc ≥ 0 (3)
However, if βδ2v−βδc ≥ βδv−c ≥ 0, then the agent follows the investment schedule (C−c, 0, c;4).
In addition, if βδv − c ≤ 0 ≤ δv − c, then he does not ﬁnish the project, (C − c, 0, 0;−).
If condition 2 is not satisﬁed,
0 ≤ −(C − c) − βδc + βδ2v
￿ ￿￿ ￿
(C−c, c, 0;3)




then he postpones the project to period 2. In period 2, he starts. In period 3, if βδv − c ≥ 0, then
(0, C − c, c;4). If βδv − c ≤ 0 ≤ δv − c, then (0, C − c, 0;−).
If the following is satisﬁed, then he never starts, (0, 0, 0; −);
−(C − c) − βδc + βδ2v
￿ ￿￿ ￿
(C−c, c, 0;3)




Sophisticated Hyperbolic Agent. The sophisticated agent thinks ahead and perceives
what he will do in the future. He then works backwards and decides what to do now. If conditions
2 and 3 are satisﬁed, then he follows (C − c, c, 0;3). If 3 and 4 are satisﬁed, then, he follows
(0, C −c, c;4). A sophisticated agent will never incur any cost without getting any payoﬀ i.e., he
never starts a project that he will not ﬁnish (he never follows (C −c, 0, 0;−) or (0, C −c, 0;−)).
This happens because he knows how he will behave in the future. On the other hand, since naive
agent misperceives his future actions, he may start projects that he will not ﬁnish.
We can also observe an outcome where the cost incurred is not equal to c. This is because the
agent knows how he will actually evaluate payoﬀs in the future, thus he can arrange the cost to
make each stage worth investing. If condition 2 is satisﬁed, but condition 3 is not, then he knows
that he cannot implement (C−c, c, 0;3). Instead, he will ﬁgure out the least costly implementable
strategy and compare it with (0, C−c, c;4) because this is surely implementable by his future self.
The least costly implementable strategy is the one that makes the second period self indiﬀerent
between postponing the remaining time to the last period and ﬁnishing it in the second period. It
is given by the following equation:
βδv − c∗ = βδ2v − βδc∗
where c∗ is the maximum amount of cost/time that sophisticated agent can allocate for the
second period because any c > c∗ will make him postpone the completion of the project to the
third period. Then, he will choose and implement max{(0, C − c, c;4), (C − c∗∗, c∗∗, 0;3)}
strategy where c∗∗ = max{C − c,c∗} and c∗∗ = c∗ (note that by deﬁnition, c∗ < c.) If c∗∗ = C − c,
then least costly implementable strategy is (C −c, c∗, c−c∗;4) and net payoﬀ of this is obviously
lower than that of (0, C − c, c;4).AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS 9
2.4. Convex Cost Speciﬁcation. Until now, we have assumed that the cost is linear in time,
C(t) = t. In this section, we generalize the analysis to the convex cost case. The problem of the






















where T is the total time to be allocated, c is the total cost7 for T, ti is the time allocated to






































3 and T − t∗
1 − t∗
2 → T
3 as α → ∞. In the experiment, we use
T = 120, l1 = 3
365, l2 = 7
365, l3 = 11
365, β and r are subject speciﬁc and convergence is achieved after
α = 3. Thus, non linear costs might oﬀer a better explanation of more even allocation of costs.
One challenge with our experiment data is that we might observe similar behavior from subjects
with diﬀerent preferences. This problem can be solved by eliciting subjects’ preferences. However,
for some quasi hyperbolic agents, we may not be able to distinguish whether they are sophisticated
or naive by simply looking at their elicited preferences and the behavior. On the other hand, if they
do not invest consecutively, they are automatically naive unless there is an exogenous shock that the
subject did not take into account initially. If they do not follow the speciﬁed cost distribution (ﬁrst
invest C−c and then c), then they are automatically sophisticated unless they have other behavioral
characteristics that will be mentioned shortly. Although we will discuss diﬀerent approaches that
may lead to diﬀerent allocation patterns in the discussion section, we will mention some of them8
here as they will be helpful in assessing the results of the experiment. One obvious factor is
exogenous cost shocks that can explain almost any type of distribution of cost behavior observed.
Concave cost function speciﬁcation is another alternative. Diﬀerent cost allocation patterns may
arise from this speciﬁcation. Another possible approach is, the so called sign eﬀect, according
to which gains are discounted at a higher rate than losses. Another reasonable approach is the
preference for improving sequences suggesting that people prefer improving sequences to declining
ones. Finally, the models of anticipatory utility argue that if people derive utility from both current
consumption and the anticipated future consumption, then the instantaneous utility function should
involve both. We will provide a more detailed discussion of these models later in the paper.AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS10
3. E/*+￿￿0+￿￿￿, D+￿￿(￿
We recruited a total of 29 Pennsylvania State University (PSU), University Park Campus, students
(both undergraduate and graduate as subjects for the experiment.) The experiment took place
in the Laboratory for Economics Management and Auctions (LEMA) at PSU. The experiment
included four sessions and two parts. The ﬁrst part included the ﬁrst session while the second,
third and fourth sessions constituted the second part. The ﬁrst session included the explanation
of the structure of the entire experiment and a set of questions that were designed to elicit time
preferences of the subjects. The sessions in the second part were called "task sessions" in which
the subjects were asked to complete a long-run task. In the recruiting process, we emphasized
that participants had to be available for all of the four sessions even though they did not have to
stay in the lab throughout each session. The purpose of imposing this availability requirement is
to eliminate any exogenous factors that may prevent subjects from coming to any of the sessions.
As will be explained later, this requirement is particularly important for the second part of the
experiment. The instructions used in the experiment are in the appendix.
The ﬁrst part of the experiment was similar to BBS. In this session, subjects were asked thirty
questions that are of the following form:
"What amount of money, $x, if paid to you today would make you indiﬀerent to $y paid to you in
t days?" $____
In the thirty questions given to the subjects, we speciﬁed the values of (y,t). A typical question
was as follows:
"What amount of money, $x, if paid to you today would make you indiﬀerent to $50 paid to you
in 30 days?" $____
The values of t included 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 days while the values of y included 10, 20, 30,
40 and 50, giving a total of thirty combinations.
As in BBS, we utilized the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak incentive mechanism to determine what
amount and when the subjects would be paid. After the subjects answered all of the thirty questions,
one of the questions was randomly drawn using dice rolls. Drawing was done for each subject
separately and in private. Suppose, for example, that the question with values y = 50 and t = 30
is drawn for subject #1 where the subject is asked what amount she would require today to make
her indiﬀerent between that amount today and $50 to be paid in one month. Suppose her answer
is $40. Then, a random number is drawn between 0 and 50 where all the numbers between 0 and
50 have equal probability of being drawn. This number is drawn separately and privately for each
of the participants in the experiment. If the number drawn is smaller than the indiﬀerence amount
the subject stated (i.e., if the number drawn is smaller than 40), she would have to wait for one
month at which time she will be paid $50. If the number drawn is greater than the indiﬀerenceAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS11
amount she stated (i.e., if the number drawn is greater than 40), then the amount drawn is paid to
her immediately. The purpose of this lottery is to attach monetary incentives to subjects’ answers
to these thirty questions, hence to prevent random responses from the subjects. Under the risk
neutrality assumption, it is a dominant strategy to report the true indiﬀerence amount in this
mechanism9.
At the end of the session, the amount the subjects earned was deposited into their Penn State
ID Card accounts at the date determined by the lottery. Payments were deposited to the subjects’
ID card accounts, as opposed to paying the subjects in cash, due to its convenience and to eliminate
uncertainties regarding the ability of the subjects to show up for payments in future periods as well
as eliminating diﬀerences in traveling time and cost to the payment site across subjects10.
The second part of the experiment was designed to observe the behavior of the subjects facing
a long-run project. In the task sessions, the subjects were asked to complete a two-hour task. Our
choice of task for the subjects needs to satisfy the following constraints: 1. It has to be costly.
That is, the task should yield disutility, not utility, for the subjects, 2. It has to be perfectly
divisible in the sense that the subjects should be able to leave it whenever they wish and return
to it at a later session, 3. It has to be long enough to keep them busy for two hours, 4. It
should not require any subject speciﬁc knowledge, age, experience, etc. Under these constraints,
we decided to ask the subjects to "ﬁll out surveys" for two hours. These surveys were obtained from
various online resources and included simple multiple choice questions about the subjects’ internet
usage, shopping behavior, choice of movie and restaurants, etc. A sample survey is included in the
Appendix. Subjects had the ﬂexibility to allocate the two-hour task time among the three task
sessions scheduled for April 20, April 24 and April 27, 2006. We required them to come to each
of the three task sessions and to sign a sign up sheet11. In addition to what they earned from the
ﬁrst part, subjects were also promised to be paid a ﬁxed amount, $35, only if they complete this
two-hour task and sign the sign up sheet at each of the three task sessions. Subjects were allowed
to work on the task up to 90 minutes (1.5 hours) in any given session. Thus, they had to work
on the task in at least two of the three task sessions to complete the task. This makes the task a
long-run task in the sense that they could not ﬁnish it in one period. We asked the subjects for
their plans (nonbinding) regarding the task before giving out the questions in the ﬁrst session and
at the beginning and end of each of the task sessions. We collected this information to observe
possible inconsistencies in their plans and actual allocations.
The payment schedule for the second part of the experiment was as follows: if the task was
completed on April 27, then the $35 payoﬀ would be deposited to the subject’s ID account on May
1. If it was completed on April 24, then the $35 payoﬀ would be deposited on April 27. This is an
example of a delayed reward where subjects are paid later than the time they ﬁnish the task. This
is consistent with the theory we have in the previous section.
Except the second session (ﬁrst task session), the subjects were free to choose the date at whichAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS12
they come to the Lab to work on the task (between 1.00-3.00 pm at the speciﬁed dates). We required
all subjects to show up for the beginning of the second session to participate in an auction. In
this second price auction, our aim was to learn about their cost of the two hour task. The auction
was as follows: ﬁrst, the subjects were asked to ﬁll out a form to indicate their plan regarding the
completion of the task. We then asked each of them to ﬁll out a bid form. This bid was for the
right to be waived from the requirement of completing the two-hour task. A subject’s bid indicated
how much money that subject was willing to give up out of his/her $35 ﬁxed earnings. The highest
bidder paid the second highest bid; hence his earnings was $35 minus the second highest bid.
The winner was exempted from completing the two-hour task and was paid according to his/her
indicated plan.
The maximum bid at the auction was $25, with a minimum bid of $0 and the second highest
bid of $1812. The average bid was $6 with zero bids, $8.3 without zero bids. Actual allocations
and bids are provided in Table 1. Two of the subjects started but did not ﬁnish the second part
of the experiment, seven of the subjects allocated the task equally between the ﬁrst two periods,
three of the subjects took a break in the second period, ﬁve of them allocated the task in all the
three periods, four of them ﬁnished the task in the ﬁrst two periods, three of them worked only in
the last two periods, one of them did not come to the second part of the experiment at all and four
of them spent the maximum time in the ﬁrst period and ﬁnished it in the second period.
After going over the instructions in the ﬁrst session, the subjects were given a quiz involving
questions about the experiment and more than 90% of the questions were answered correctly. This
indicates that subjects had a good understanding of the structure and the rules of the experiment.
4. M+￿2￿￿￿,￿()
The econometric method we used to elicit the preferences is very similar to that of Benhabib et al.
The method involves a four-parameter discounting model as follows:
D(y, t; θ, r, β, b) = βd(t; θ, r) −
b
y
where d(t; θ, r) = (1 − (1 − θ)rt)
1
1−θ
Here, (y,t) is the money-time pair, θ is the curvature of the discount function, β is the quasi
hyperbolic component of present bias, b is the ﬁxed cost component of the present bias and r is the
discount rate when the discounting is exponential though in general it is a component of discount
rate that is independent of time. Exponential, hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic approaches are all
embedded in this one speciﬁcation. Without the present bias components and for some speciﬁc
curvature of the discount function, the discount function becomes:
D(y, t; θ, r) = (1 − (1 − θ)rt)
1
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When θ = 1, this turns into the exponential discounting:
D(y, t; θ = 1, r) = e−rt
When θ = 2, discount function turns into the hyperbolic discounting:
D(y, t; θ = 2, r) =
1
1 + rt
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, we obtain the indiﬀerence points of each subject on money-
time pairs as mentioned earlier. We did this by asking the subjects for the indiﬀerence amount to
be earned today, $x, to a speciﬁed late payment ($y, t) for diﬀerent combinations of $ amounts and
time horizons. As a result, we have 30 observations13 for each subject i = 1,2,...,29 for x where
x = yD(y,t) under the risk neutrality assumption.
In the most general form, we assume that the data generating process for each subject i is:
x = yi(x,t)D(yi(x,t), t; θi, ri, βi, bi)εi(x,t)
where εi(x,t) is assumed to be lognormally distributed14 and i.i.d. with respect to subjects and
questions. The estimation method we used is the non-linear least squares15.
For the second part of the experiment, we used diﬀerent statistical approaches to compare the
actual data and the theoretical predictions. Recall that we assigned the subjects a project to be
completed in two hours and we restricted the maximum amount of work for a given period to 1.5
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From the second part of the experiment, we obtained (the actual data) (ti
j)∗ for all subjects
i = 1,2,...29 and for all periods j = 1,2,3. From the theory, we calculated predicted values ￿ ti
j for
all i = 1,2,...29 and for all j = 1,2,3. The statistical approach that we use to compare the actual
data and the theoretical predictions is as follows:AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS14
1. We ﬁrst look at the ratio of the sum of errors to the maximum error. We look at both the
sum of absolute errors and sum of squared errors.










where N is the number of subjects. The numerator ﬁrst takes a subject, calculates
the absolute error we made for that subject and then adds these errors across subjects.
This number alone does not mean anything unless we compare it to what the maximum
possible error is. The denominator is the maximum possible error one can make in
predicting the allocations16.
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For both of these values, a closer statistic to zero represents a better prediction. These
statistics are similar to R − Square (to be more precise, they are similar to 1 − (R −
Square)).
2. Then, we look at the correlation coeﬃcient indicating the strength and direction of a linear
relationship between two random variables17. Speciﬁcally, the statistics we look at is
S2 = correlation(￿ ti
j, (ti
j)∗) ∀ j = 1, 2, 3,
where a statistics closer to plus one represents a better prediction18.












∀ j = 1, 2, 3.
For both of the statistics, a value closer to one represents a better prediction.
4. We also look at a measure called eﬀect size to measure the strength of the relationship between
two variables. The most commonly used eﬀect size measure is Cohen’s d. It is deﬁned as
follows:
d =
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where meani and SDi are the mean and standard deviation for group i, for i = 1,2. The most
accepted opinion about the interpretation of the resultant eﬀect size is that 0.2 is indicative
of a small eﬀect, 0.5 a medium and 0.8 a large eﬀect size. A larger measure means that there
is a consistent diﬀerence between the two series.
Although S1a, S1b, S3a and d carry some valuable information about the predictions, it would
be more meaningful if we compare our statistics with the statistics obtained by a random allocation
(we will refer to them as SR1a, SR1b, SR3a and dr). If S1a < SR1a, S1b < SR1b, S3a > SR3a and
d < dr, then we conclude that our prediction does better than the one with random allocation. In
other words, it has more predictive power than the one with random allocations. Note that this
approach is appropriate for S1a, S1b and S3a, but not for S2 and S3b.
5. R+￿￿,￿￿
In this section, we report the results from the econometric examination of the data. First, we
discuss the results from the elicitation of the preferences, ﬁrst part of the experiment. Then, we
report the results from the second part of the experiment, behavior of the players in the long-run
project.
5.1. Preference Elicitation. We examined the data from the ﬁrst part of the experiment by
using diﬀerent model speciﬁcations mentioned in the methodology section. There are ﬁve diﬀerent
model speciﬁcations and we will report results from each of them in the order that they were
mentioned in the methodology section. The ﬁrst three estimation methods are identical to those of
BBS and we will compare our results with theirs. The last two estimation methods are diﬀerent in
the sense that the curvature of the discount function is restricted to 1 and present bias is included
both in the form of a variable and a ﬁxed cost.
In the ﬁrst estimation, we specify the discount function as follows:
d(t;θ, r, β, b) = d(t;θ, r, β = 1, b = 0)
The values for the parameters θ and r are signiﬁcant for 11 and 12 out of 25 subjects, respectively.
They are jointly signiﬁcant in only 5 cases. The exponential speciﬁcation, θ = 1, is rejected for 12
subjects. The values for r are pretty high such that in 18 cases, it is more than 100% and for 10
subjects, it is in the order of thousands. On the other hand, for 5 subjects, it is less than 100%
and its average is 55%. This speciﬁcation does not seem to be an appropriate model because of the
high values for r and the insigniﬁcance of the parameters in more than half of the cases. Table 2
shows the results for all the subjects.
In the second estimation, the following discount function is used:
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Here, we basically added the present bias parameter in the form of a ﬁxed cost, b. As opposed
to what BBS found in their data, we could not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant support for the present bias in the
form of a ﬁxed cost. For only half of the subjects, the ﬁxed cost b is estimated signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
than 0, in 5 of these cases, it is less than zero and the average is approximately $1.3 (minimum is
$ −4.7 and maximum is $12.) Moreover, this speciﬁcation does not allow us to get more plausible
estimates for r either. The numbers we obtained in the ﬁrst estimation are very similar to the
ones in this speciﬁcation. Only half of the values for r are signiﬁcant and the point estimates are
almost the same as above. Both the hypothesis of exponential discounting, θ = 1, and hyperbolic
discounting, θ = 2, are not rejected at the 95% conﬁdence interval for half of the subjects (for two
of the subjects, they are not rejected at the 90% conﬁdence interval). The range of the values of
θ is from −18 to +97 (in one case it is in the order of negative thousands.) As in BBS, we are
not able to distinguish the exponential discounting from hyperbolic discounting. The results are
reported in Table 3.
In the third model speciﬁcation, we allow all parameters to vary (there are no restrictions on the
parameters.) The present bias in the form of variable cost (it is variable in the sense that the cost of
earning y at a future date, (1−β)y, increases linearly with y), β, for 19 subjects is greater than 1.
The number of signiﬁcant β values are 19 out of 24 subjects. For 7 of these 19 subjects, we could not
reject the hypothesis that β = 1. Among these 12 subjects, only 5 are signiﬁcantly smaller than 1.
These results are similar to the results of BBS. The θ and r parameters do not seem to be signiﬁcant
at all and for 19 of the 24 subjects both the hypothesis of exponential and hyperbolic discounting
could not be rejected. For 16 subjects, the ﬁxed cost b is estimated signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than 0,
in 4 of these cases, it is less than zero and the average is approximately $1.9 (minimum is $−4.26
and maximum is $17.) As a result, the estimates for the ﬁxed cost b are not very much diﬀerent
than the previous case. The results are reported in Table 4.
Now we turn to the next two speciﬁcations where we ﬁx the curvature of the discount function
to unity, θ = 1. In other words, we assume an exponential speciﬁcation and we added the quasi
hyperbolic component, β , and then the ﬁxed cost component, b.
In the fourth speciﬁcation, we used the following discount function:
d(t;θ, r, β, b) = d(t;θ = 1, r, β, b = 0)
This means that discounting is exponential and there is no present bias in the form of a ﬁxed
cost but there is a quasi hyperbolic component. In this speciﬁcation, all the β￿s are signiﬁcant and
for 22 out of 25 subjects, r￿s are also signiﬁcant (two of these are signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence
interval, one is at 95%, one is at 97% and others are signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence interval.)
Now only 9 out of 25 β values are greater than 1 and for 4 of these, the hypothesis of β = 1 cannot
be rejected. The values for β range from 0.64 to 1.19. The average of β￿s is 0.92 (Excluding the
ones that are not rejected to be 1, the average becomes 0.9). Moreover, the values of r are more
reasonable in the sense that for half of the subjects it is less than 100% (average is around 45%),AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS17
for only one subject, it is in the order of thousands and the average is 1.9 (1.45 without the highest
one.) The results are reported in Table 5.
In the last speciﬁcation, we used the following discount function:
d(t;θ, r, β, b) = d(t;θ = 1, r, β, b)
where we allow both present bias components, ﬁxed and variable. The estimates we obtained for
β and r in this speciﬁcation are very similar to the ones we obtained in the previous speciﬁcation.
All β￿s and all but 5 r’s are signiﬁcant. Now 12 out of 25 β￿s are greater than 1 and for 4 of these,
the hypothesis of β = 1 cannot be rejected. The values for β range from 0.64 to 1.22. For 16 of the
subjects, the ﬁxed cost b is estimated to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than 0, in 5 of these cases, it is
less than zero and the average is approximately $1.6 (minimum is $−4.43 and maximum is $17.6.)
The results are reported in Table 6.
In summary, the last two speciﬁcations seem to be more reasonable in explaining the data,
especially the fourth one. As a result, the present bias in the form of a ﬁxed cost does not receive
as strong support as in the BBS paper. The data tends to be in support of exponential speciﬁcation
along with the quasi hyperbolic component with an average of 0.92, which is still higher than the one
reported by Laibson-Repetto-Tobacman (2004). Since the variable cost is found to be signiﬁcantly
less than 1, using it in the economics applications remains meaningful. As mentioned in BBS, these
results are obtained with the data including small rewards and the short time-horizons, thus, we
have to be very cautious in generalizing our results.
5.2. Long-Run Project. We now report the results from the second part of the experiment.
We report the values of statistics for diﬀerent speciﬁcations. For the case of linear cost, we obtain
the following results:
S1a= 0.37 S1b= 0.19 S2= 0.37,0.32,0.49 S3a= 0.72,1.18,1.71 S3b= 1.5,1.18,1.71
SR1a= 0.46 SR1b= 0.18 S2= SR3a= 0.76,0.82,2.47 S3b=
d = 0.23,0.57,0.13
dr= 0.97,0.35,2.53
The ﬁrst row represents the values of statistics that we deﬁned in the methodology section. It
roughly means that the model explained %63 and %81 of the data in absolute and squared error
terms, respectively. The correlation terms, S2, are all positive meaning that the data series are
positively correlated and correlation is medium in two of the series and large in the last one. The
ratios of means and variances are fairly close to one, which implies a good ﬁt between the observed
behavior and the theoretical prediction. The values of Cohen’s d are fairly small implying that
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two series.
When we compare our statistics with the statistics that are obtained by even allocations (for
every agent, the time is allocated equally) presented in the second row, we conclude that our
predictions actually perform weakly better in all statistics than even allocations statistics.AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS18
For convex cost with C(t)= t2, we have,
S1a= 0.47 S1b= 0.18 S2= 0.2,−0.14,0.37 S3a= 0.72,0.84,2.58 S3b= 0.02,0.007,0.005
SR1a= 0.46 SR1b= 0.18 S2= SR3a= 0.76,0.82,2.47 S3b=
d = 0.55,0.08,0.81
dr= 0.97,0.35,2.53
Although the convex cost speciﬁcation predicts allocations well for some agents, overall, it does
not oﬀer better results than the linear cost approach.
By looking at the subjects’ allocation pattern and based on the theory, we can say something
about the types of the subjects. Observationally, to distinguish the types of the agents, the following
point is important. Among those subjects for whom it is not optimal to postpone at t = 1, naive
types will spend the minimum time at t = 1. However, sophisticated types will check whether or
not this is an implementable plan by verifying the feasibility of ﬁnishing the rest of the task at
t = 2. If it is feasible, then they start with C−c at t = 1 and ﬁnish with c at t = 2. If not, then they
ﬁgure out c∗ that is the maximum tolerable amount of time leading them not to postpone at t = 2.
They take c∗∗ = max{C −c, c∗} and then they compare spending C −c∗∗ at t = 1 and c∗∗ at t = 2
with postponing the task. Based on their elicited preferences, we calculate c∗∗ values at which it
is not optimal for some subjects to postpone at t = 1 but it is optimal for them to postpone at
t = 2. For three subjects who are in this category, c∗∗ is 65, 70 and 80. For these subjects, it is
optimal to incur C −c∗∗ at t = 1 and c∗∗ at t = 2 rather than postponing. Only for these subjects,
the theory is able to make a prediction as to whether they are sophisticated or naive. However,
the sophisticated approach predicts these subjects’ behavior better. There are six more agents for
whom it is optimal to postpone in the ﬁrst period. Unfortunately, we cannot identify the types of
these subjects because based on their elicited preferences, naive and sophisticated types behave in
the same way. For the rest of the subjects, the theory again suggests the same pattern of allocation
(incurring C − c at t = 1 and c at t = 2) for both types.
As a result, when the theoretical predictions are compared with the actual data obtained from
the experiment, we ﬁnd that the theory overall is capable of predicting the allocation pattern
to some extent. Although most of the subjects’ allocation is not predicted perfectly, it is fairly
evident that our analysis has some predictive power. In terms of type categorization, in most of the
cases, the theory is not able to make distinction between the sophisticated and naive hyperbolic
types. This is because the theory predicts the same pattern for both types, based on their elicited
preferences. However, if other modelling approaches are also taken into account, the agents can be
categorized based on their types19. We brieﬂy elaborate on the categorization we made based on
the choices of the subjects in the next section.AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS19
6. D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
We observed some noisy behavior both in the preference elicitation and the elicitation of individual
task costs. Firstly, some subjects showed no discounting at all in the ﬁrst part of the experiment.
Fortunately, we gave all subjects a set of hypothetical questions as a part of the costly task. These
questions were in the same format as the questions in the ﬁrst part where we used diﬀerent time
horizons and payoﬀs. More speciﬁcally, we asked four set of questions: 1. High rewards (ten times
higher, $100-$500) with same time horizons, 2. Same rewards with long time horizons (0.25, 0.5,
1, 3, 6, 12 months), 3. High rewards with long time horizons, and 4. The same questions in BBS
(y: 10, 20, 30, 50, 100; t: 3 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months). Half of the
agents who did not show any discounting with real rewards did not show any discounting with
hypothetical rewards either20. We cannot infer the discount functions of these agents. One of the
subjects reported meaningless $x values, so we excluded him.
Secondly, we designed a second price auction to learn about the subjects’ valuations of the task
cost. This is explained in section 3. Although it is a weakly dominant strategy to reveal the true
valuation, some subjects reported a zero valuation and some reported very low valuations. We redid
the analysis by using the bids of $7 and $14 (average rate is $7 per hour in the jobs on campus)
for these subjects, but obtained no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the results.
In the second part, we performed our analysis based on the best ﬁtting model to the data from
the ﬁrst part, namely the exponential discounting model with a quasi hyperbolic component. Even
though the predicted pattern is not exactly observed for most of the subjects, this model had some
predictive power.
The results suggest that there are various potential factors that have not been captured in the
models or the experimental design. An exogenous cost shock, for instance, can explain almost any
type of observed behavior (including not ﬁnishing the task.) Concave speciﬁcation of cost function
may be another alternative.
The issue of the cost function being convex or concave is related to the eﬃciency issues. If there
are decreasing returns to eﬀort, then the cost function should be convex. If the cost function is
convex, then it induces the subjects to allocate the task among periods more equally. However,
if there are increasing returns to eﬀort (one interpretation is that as you work, it becomes easier
to ﬁnish an additional unit of the task), then the cost function should be concave. In that case,
there are two competing factors in allocating the task. Since it is more eﬃcient to work more at
a given period, you are willing to spend more hours at the beginning. On the other hand, since
you discount the future, it is less costly to bear the cost in the future and this makes you postpone
working. These factors work in opposite directions21 and the subject’s allocation would be skewed
towards the dominant factor.
Another possible explanation is the so called sign eﬀect, which argues that gains are discounted
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ately rather than delay it, which in our case implies working more in earlier periods (see Benzion,
Rapoport, Yagil, 1989; Loewenstein, 1987 for some examples.) Another reasonable behavioral spec-
iﬁcation is the preference for improving sequences. Many studies dealing with the preferences over
the sequences of outcomes found that people prefer improving sequences to declining ones (see
Frederick-Loewenstein, 2002 for an overview.) This may also explain why people invest earlier in
our case. Last but not least is the models of anticipatory utility. It posits that if people derive utility
from both current consumption and the anticipated future consumption, then the instantaneous
utility function should involve these too. Loewenstein (1987) has a formal model of this kind and
gives a possible explanation for preferring improving sequences and for handling undesirable tasks
promptly instead of postponing them. We refer the reader to Frederick-Loewenstein-O’Donoghue,
2002, to see more detailed discussion of the most of the issues mentioned in this section.
The last three approaches above are partially supported by the behavior we observed. For
example, the average time spent in the ﬁrst period is more than ﬁfty minutes while it is predicted
to be less than thirty minutes because, if all costs and rewards are discounted at the same rate,
then it becomes optimal to postpone the costs towards the end. This observation signals that these
three approaches play a role in agents’ allocation decisions. However, we cannot separate these
three approaches because all imply a similar behavior pattern in our framework.
We also ﬁnd that more than half of the subjects allocated more than half of the task to the
ﬁrst period. This behavior may be attributed to the last three models discussed earlier. Three of
these subjects invest less in the second period than in the third period. This may be attributed to
these agents being naive in their beliefs. Four of these subjects who ﬁnished the task in the second
period invested much more in the ﬁrst period than the second period, and this may be attributed
to these subjects being sophisticated in their beliefs. Seven of the agents invested equally in ﬁrst
two periods and ﬁnished the task in the second period. This may be attributed again to the three
models and to subjects having convex cost. Two of the agents can be identiﬁed as naive hyperbolic
(because one started the task but did not ﬁnish and the other allocated the cost to all three periods
in a naive way) and two of them as sophisticated hyperbolic. Three of them could not be identiﬁed
as exponential, naive or sophisticated. Two of them may be identiﬁed as sophisticated with a
concave cost. Table 7 displays the categorization we made based on diﬀerent models in Table 7.
Our results indicate that agents display diverse time preferences and follow diverse time allocation
in multi-period investments. The models we studied in the paper explain the observed behavior of
some but not all of the subjects..
7. C￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿
In this paper, we elicit time preferences by using the experimental and econometric methods of
Benhabib-Bisin-Schotter (2006). Then, we test the theory of behavior of possibly time-inconsistent
agents in a long run project based on O’Donoghue and Rabin(2005) by using the quasi hyperbolic
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is supported more by the data compared to the other speciﬁcations. As opposed to Benhabib et
al., we do not ﬁnd support for a ﬁxed cost form of present bias. Since we obtain our results with
the data that do not include high rewards and long time-horizons, we have to be very careful in
generalizing our results. However, with the overall results we have at hand, we conclude that it is
diﬃcult to make generalizations as to which discounted utility model performs better in explaining
observed choices.
After eliciting time preferences of the subjects, we observed the behavior of the subjects in a
multi-period project. We used the estimated preferences to predict the allocation patterns. We ﬁnd
that the predictions of the theory capture most of the subjects’ observed behavior and the theory
has some predictive power. Since the theory’s prediction based on the elicited parameters is not
able to make distinction between most of the agents’ types, we use diﬀerent models, namely, sign
eﬀect, the preference for improving sequences, anticipatory utility models, to help us understand
the observed behavior, and found support for these models in our data.
The results suggest that a subject speciﬁc approach is more useful to employ. Rather than
picking up a speciﬁc model and following a uniform prediction for all of the subjects (e.g., assuming
all agents have a linear or convex cost), it is more productive to recognize heterogeneity among the
subjects and employ alternative models to understand the behavior of diﬀerent groups of subjects.
This also suggests that, given that we observed very diﬀerent behavior patterns even in our small
sample, we should view diﬀerent intertemporal choice models as being complementary rather than
conﬂicting or competing with each other.
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Kalyan Chatterjee, Edward Green and Susana Esteban
for helpful comments and the Smeal College of Business Research Grants at Penn State for ﬁnancial
support.
NOTES
1. See Ainslie, 1992, Ainslie-Herrnstein, 1981, Laibson, 1997, 2003, Loewenstein-Prelec, 1992,
O’Donoghue T., Rabin M., 1999a.
2. See, for example, Akerlof (1991), Dellavigna-Malmendier (2006), and O’Donoghue-Rabin
(1999b, 2001).
3. The simplest case is where n = 2 and T = 3, and this is what we will examine in this paper,
both theoretically and experimentally.
4. Examples include Akin (2004), Ariely-Wertenbroch (2002), Fischer (2001) and O’Donoghue-
Rabin (2005).
5. The possible types are exponential, naive hyperbolic and sophisticated hyperbolic types. We
do not allow partially naive types in this paper. All types will be explained in the model
explicitly.AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS22
6. The cost is most likely a function of time and eﬀort, c(t,e). We will assume that it is only
a function of time and satisﬁes c(t) ≥ 0, c￿(t) ≥ 0 and c￿￿(t) ≥ 0, for all t ≥ 0. The case of
concave cost function will be discussed later in the paper.
7. In linear cost case, α = 1, ci represents the monetary cost of spending ti minutes in period i
and ci = cti
T where c is the cost of spending T minutes on the project.
8. For the last three alternative speciﬁcations, see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue
(2002).
9. Some of the participants reported the same amount $x for all $y values. This suggests that
they do not discount the future at all and they wanted to guarantee earning $y.
10. Student ID cards can be used to make purchases at any on campus and many of the oﬀ
campus establishments (cafetarias, restaurants, bookstores, coﬀe shops, etc.).
11. This requirement is part of our eﬀort to eliminate the impact of traveling time and cost to the
experimental site (otherwise, subjects with higher traveling costs would be more likely to opt
to complete the task in two, rather than three, sessions). This makes the subjects focus only
on the task, not on other transaction costs. A similar method is used in Mukherji-Villaverde,
2002.
12. 8 out of 24 subjects submitted a $0 bid. We did our analysis by using $7 (the average bid)
and $14 (the average wage for a two-hour job on campus) as the cost of two-hour task for
these subjects, but the results did not change signiﬁcantly.
13. Recall that values of t include 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 days while the values of y include 10,
20, 30, 40 and 50, thus giving a total of thirty combinations.
14. We also estimated the parameters under the assumption that
x = yi(x,t)D(yi(x,t), t; θi, ri, βi, bi) + εi(x,t)
where errors, εi(x,t), are assumed to be normally distributed and i.i.d. with respect to
subjects and questions. The results did not change signiﬁcantly.
15. The estimations are performed both in EViews and Matlab. We are grateful to Prof. Benhabib
for providing the Matlab code.
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If you add these across the subjects, you get 180∗29. The denominator in part b is 140∗90∗29
because the maximum deviation for a subject is (90)2 + (60)2 + (30)2 = 140 ∗ 90.
17. Cohen (1988) has suggested the following interpretation for correlations in psychological re-
search:
Correlation Negative Positive
Small -0.29 to -0.10 0.10 to 0.29
Medium -0.49 to -0.30 0.30 to 0.49










































19. Here, type has a more general meaning than used in the paper and it covers all modeling
approaches we mentioned throughout the paper.
20. Using hypothetical or real rewards is a choice of design and some studies showed that experi-
ments with hypothetical rewards yield smaller discount rates than the ones with real rewards,
although there is no consensus on this. For a detailed discussion of this, see Frederick-
Loewenstein-O’Donoghue, 2002.
21. There is, most probably, a relationship between the concavity of the cost function and the
parameters of the discount function.
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0.00 30 0 90 Subject 29
NA NA NA NA Subject 28*
15.00 0 30 90 Subject 27
4.25 10 90 20 Subject 26
5.00 0 50 70 Subject 25
5.00 0 30 90 Subject 24
5.00 15 45 60 Subject 23
0.00 0 30 90 Subject 22*
0.00 0 60 60 Subject 21
0.00 0 0 30 Subject 20*
10.00 0 30 90 Subject 19*
18.00 0 60 60 Subject 18
10.00 0 0 50 Subject 17
0.50 0 60 60 Subject 16
NA 15 75 30 Subject 15
0.00 0 60 60 Subject 14
0.00 0 60 60 Subject 13
25.00 90 30 0 Subject 12
5.00 0 40 80 Subject 11
5.01 30 25 65 Subject 10
0.00 30 0 90 Subject 9
15.00 0 75 45 Subject 8
10.02 0 60 60 Subject 7
NA 90 30 0 Subject 6
5.00 0 70 50 Subject 5
1.00 0 60 60 Subject 4
1.00 15 45 60 Subject 3
0.00 30 90 0 Subject 2
10.00 50 70 0 Subject 1
Cost ($) Period 3 (minutes) Period 2 (minutes) Period 1 (minutes) TABLE -1
* These are excluded in the analysis because of invalid data.AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS27
0.02*** 37.81 Subject 25
0.78*** 5.67*** Subject 24
34.98 5.48** Subject 23
0.28*** 22.24*** Subject 22
0.01 554.17 Subject 21
8.68 36.94* Subject 20
0.06*** -11.09*** Subject 19
0.57*** -14.38* Subject 18
3.65* 1.95 Subject 17
12.60 26.51 Subject 16
1.79*** -5.41*** Subject 15
5.22 10.51 Subject 14
2240 21.44*** Subject 13
1904 95.41* Subject 12
0.82*** -7.43 Subject 11
3.77*** -1.63*** Subject 10
443 11.10 Subject 9
7.46*** 22.64*** Subject 8
5.89*** -0.41 Subject 7
162 8.06 Subject 6
4.62*** 3.20 Subject 5
47.26 32.52*** Subject 4
9634948 36.95 Subject 3
1.09*** -5.72 Subject 2
36.27 48.90*** Subject 1
r Teta TABLE 2
* Significant at the 90% confidence interval
** Significant at the 95% confidence interval
*** Significant at the 99% confidence intervalAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS28
0.46*** 0.01*** -12.64 Subject 25
-4.70*** 1.14*** 7.07*** Subject 24
12.83*** 1.63* -5.56 Subject 23
0.38 0.26*** 21.50*** Subject 22
1.29*** -5.01E+19 -16256 Subject 21
-4.45 14.50 36.42* Subject 20
0.40 0.05*** -12.77*** Subject 19
-0.58** 1.00*** -2.88 Subject 18
-2.38* 8.11 4.38 Subject 17
2.91*** 0.42 -9.73 Subject 16
3.20*** 0.63** -18.24** Subject 15
1.18 2.85 9.32 Subject 14
-0.43 2848 21.11*** Subject 13
0.92*** 166 97.59*** Subject 12
0.15 0.72** -9.72 Subject 11
-2.47*** 5.50*** -0.54 Subject 10
-4.27** 1104 9.03* Subject 9
-0.05 7.84*** 22.79*** Subject 8
-1.02 6.69*** -0.17 Subject 7
0.86 140.00 8.43 Subject 6
1.50** 2.71** 1.04 Subject 5
0.84*** 19.67** 32.04*** Subject 4
1.15 27746392 44.21 Subject 3
0.99*** 0.53*** -19.37** Subject 2
-0.72** 97.96 48.32*** Subject 1
b r Teta TABLE 3
* Significant at the 90% confidence interval
** Significant at the 95% confidence interval
*** Significant at the 99% confidence intervalAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS29
* Significant at the 90% confidence interval
** Significant at the 95% confidence interval
*** Significant at the 99% confidence interval
1.00*** 0.86*** 0.03** 77.20* Subject 25
1.01*** -4.43*** 1.46*** 8.02*** Subject 24
1.16*** 17.89*** 2.52* -2.49 Subject 23
1.02*** 1.16* 0.63* 29.95*** Subject 22
1.00*** 1.30*** 0.02 887 Subject 21
0.92*** -4.35 0.07 -12.47 Subject 20
1.01*** 1.44*** 0.07*** -6.67*** Subject 19
1.01*** -0.50* 1.24* 0.59 Subject 18
3.18 -2.17 37949 7.69 Subject 17
1.05*** 3.45*** 2.02 17.45 Subject 16
1.07*** 4.63*** 0.96*** -11.49*** Subject 15
2.26 1.91 78100 13.05 Subject 14
0.71*** -0.43 0.38 -30.22 Subject 13
0.95*** 0.92*** 0.14 -72.48 Subject 12
1.05*** 0.73** 2.04 4.96 Subject 11
1.11*** -1.37** 7.53*** 0.32 Subject 10
1.84 -4.27** 144932 9.00 Subject 9
1.03*** -0.05 23.12 25.41*** Subject 8
1.20*** 0.92 10.39*** 0.79 Subject 7
2.98 0.90 227405 7.93 Subject 6
3.60 2.65*** 93106 8.49** Subject 5
0.93*** 0.83*** 0.47** -16.66 Subject 4
0.68*** 1.13 1.06 34.55 Subject 3
1.03*** 1.50*** 0.82** -9.93 Subject 2
1.10 -0.72** 8431 48.57 Subject 1
Beta b r Teta TABLE 4AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS30
0.016*** 1.0004*** Subject 25
0.450*** 0.985*** Subject 24
4.809*** 0.801*** Subject 23
0.095*** 0.994*** Subject 22
0.003 0.999*** Subject 21
0.141** 0.937*** Subject 20
0.103*** 1.006*** Subject 19
1.251*** 1.022*** Subject 18
3.584*** 1.016*** Subject 17
0.902* 0.940*** Subject 16
4.247*** 1.025*** Subject 15
1.874* 0.972*** Subject 14
1.533*** 0.744*** Subject 13
0.312** 0.923*** Subject 12
1.524*** 1.025*** Subject 11
9.376*** 1.190*** Subject 10
1.750 0.649*** Subject 9
0.987*** 0.976*** Subject 8
11.859*** 1.197*** Subject 7
1.198 0.614*** Subject 6
3.631*** 1.003*** Subject 5
0.842*** 0.913*** Subject 4
0.530 0.735*** Subject 3
1.627*** 1.007*** Subject 2
0.499*** 0.936*** Subject 1
r Beta TABLE 5
* Significant at the 90% confidence interval
** Significant at the 95% confidence interval
*** Significant at the 99% confidence intervalAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS31
* Significant at the 90% confidence interval
** Significant at the 95% confidence interval
*** Significant at the 99% confidence interval
0.86*** 0.02*** 1.00*** Subject 25
-4.33*** 0.36*** 0.97*** Subject 24
17.68*** 4.77*** 1.22*** Subject 23
1.21* 0.10*** 1.00*** Subject 22
1.30*** 0.00 1.00*** Subject 21
-4.43 0.14** 0.92*** Subject 20
1.41*** 0.10*** 1.01*** Subject 19
-0.50* 1.27*** 1.01*** Subject 18
-2.18 3.86*** 0.96*** Subject 17
3.45*** 0.82** 1.03*** Subject 16
4.66 3.71*** 1.15*** Subject 15
1.91 1.77* 1.02*** Subject 14
-0.43 1.56*** 0.73*** Subject 13
0.92*** 0.30*** 0.95*** Subject 12
0.73** 1.49*** 1.04*** Subject 11
-1.32* 9.82*** 1.16*** Subject 10
-4.26** 2.21 0.53*** Subject 9
-0.05 0.99*** 0.95*** Subject 8
0.95 11.44*** 1.22*** Subject 7
0.96 1.14 0.64*** Subject 6
2.64*** 3.34*** 1.07*** Subject 5
0.83*** 0.82*** 0.94*** Subject 4
1.13 0.33 0.67*** Subject 3
1.50*** 1.56*** 1.05*** Subject 2
-0.72** 0.51*** 0.92*** Subject 1
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** 1. Naive Hyperbolic; 2. Sophisticated Hyperbolic; 3. Convex Cost; 4. Concave Cost; 5. Sign Effect; 
6. Preference for Improving Sequences; 7. Anticipatory Utility
* Prediction of naive hyperbolic model for these agents is (30, 0, 90)
1, 5, 6, 7 0 30 90 30 0 90 Subject 25
2 or 5, 6, 7 0 70 50 0 30 90 Subject 24*
1 or 2 0 90 30 10 90 20 Subject 23
2 or 5, 6, 7 0 90 30 0 50 70 Subject 22
2 or 5, 6, 7 0 90 30 0 30 90 Subject 21
5, 6, 7 90 30 0 15 45 60 Subject 20
3, 5, 6, 7 0 30 90 0 60 60 Subject 19
3, 5, 6, 7 0 30 90 0 60 60 Subject 18
1 0 90 30 0 0 50 Subject 17
3, 5, 6, 7 0 80 40 0 60 60 Subject 16*
1 0 90 30 15 75 30 Subject 15
3, 5, 6, 7 0 90 30 0 60 60 Subject 14
3, 5, 6, 7 90 30 0 0 60 60 Subject 13
1 or 2 90 30 0 90 30 0 Subject 12
3, 5, 6, 7 0 30 90 0 40 80 Subject 11
3, 5, 6, 7 or 1, 5, 6, 7  0 30 90 30 25 65 Subject 10
1, 5, 6, 7 90 30 0 30 0 90 Subject 9
2 0 90 30 0 75 45 Subject 8
3, 5, 6, 7 0 30 90 0 60 60 Subject 7
1 or 2 90 30 0 90 30 0 Subject 6
2 0 90 30 0 70 50 Subject 5
3, 5, 6, 7 0 90 30 0 60 60 Subject 4
4 or 5, 6, 7 0 65 55 15 45 60 Subject 3*
2, 4 0 90 30 30 90 0 Subject 2
2, 4 90 30 0 50 70 0 Subject 1
Model Prediction** Period 3 Period 2 Period 1 Period 3 Period 2 Period 1 TABLE 7
Prediction of Sophisticated 
Hyperbolic Model




Thank you for coming. This is a study of individual decision making. The instructions are
simple. If you follow them closely, you will make some amount of money. How much and when
you get paid will be based on your decisions. All the money that you earn will be deposited to
your Penn State ID Card accounts. The data collected in this experiment will be used in economic
decision analysis and the identity and choices of participants will be kept conﬁdential.
This is the ﬁrst session of a sequence of 4 sessions. The remaining three sessions will be held
on April 20 (Thursday) - April 24 (Monday) - April 27 (Thursday)). At the end of today’s session,
you will earn either some amount today or some other amount in the future depending on your
decisions and a lottery process. In the remaining three sessions, your payoﬀ will again depend on
what you do in those sessions. The details will be explained shortly.
In this session, you will be asked thirty simple questions and your answers will determine when
you will be paid. The payment amount will be determined by a lottery process and by your answers
to these questions.
As an example, here are two of the thirty questions you will be asked to answer:
"What amount of money, if paid to you today would make you indiﬀerent to $10 paid to you
in 5 days?"
"What amount of money, if paid to you today would make you indiﬀerent to $50 paid to you
in 1 month?"
After you answer all of the thirty questions, one of the questions will be drawn randomly.
Suppose, for example, that at the end of the experiment the second question above is drawn where
you are asked what amount you would require today to make you indiﬀerent between that amount
today and $50 to be paid to you in one month. Suppose your answer is $40. Then, we will draw a
random number between 0 and 50 where all the numbers between 0 and 50 have equal probability
of being drawn. We will draw this number separately for each of the participants in the experiment.
If the number drawn for you is smaller than the indiﬀerence amount you stated (i.e., if the number
drawn is smaller than 40), you would have to wait for one month at which time you will be paid
$50. If the number drawn is greater than the indiﬀerence amount you stated, then the amount
drawn will be paid to you today. Note that the smaller the indiﬀerence amount you chose as your
response to the question drawn, the higher the chances that you will be paid today and the smaller
the expected amount that you will be paid today.
The following graph summarizes the schedule for the experiment:AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS34
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T im e S chedule
In the three sessions that will follow today’s session (we will refer to these sessions as “task
sessions”), the main objective will be to complete a "two-hour task" that involves ﬁlling out some
simple surveys. You have the ﬂexibility to allocate the two-hour task time among the three task
sessions scheduled for April 20 (Thursday), April 24 (Monday) and April 27 (Thursday). You have
to come to each of the three task sessions and sign a sign up sheet. You will be paid a ﬁxed amount,
$35, only if you complete this two-hour task and sign the sign up sheet in each of the three task
sessions. You can work on the task at most 90 minutes (1.5 hours) in a given session. This means
that you will need to work on the task in at least two of the three task sessions to complete the
task. Note that even if you complete the two-hour task in two of the three sessions, you still have
to come and sign the sign up sheet in the other session. We will send you remainder emails one
day before the task sessions.
If you complete the task on April 27, then the $35 payoﬀ will be deposited to your ID account
on May 1. Note again that even if you complete the task on April 24, you need to come to the
third task session on April 27 and sign the sign up sheet. There is no session on May 1 and no need
to show up on that date. It is a date of payment for those who choose to complete the two-hour
task on April 27.
As mentioned earlier, you can divide the two-hour time period to complete the task in any way
you like among the three task sessions. Please indicate your plan regarding the task by ﬁlling out
the schedule below and crossing appropriate boxes. These plans are not binding. Changing your
plans will not aﬀect your payoﬀ as long as you complete the task and sign the sign up sheet in all
the three task sessions.
APRIL 20: ____ minutes;
APRIL 24: ____ minutes, Finish the task;
APRIL 27: ____ minutes, Finish the task;
Are there any questions?
We next ask you to answer the following thirty questions in the space provided:AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS35
QUESTIONS...
End of Session 1 Questionnaire
Please answer the following question (your answer will not impact your payoﬀ or the plan you
provided before for the remaining sessions):
Suppose we maintained the requirement of coming to all the three task sessions and signing a
sign up sheet and gave you the choice between the following two options:
Option 1. You determine the allocation of the two-hour time as you wish, as you have now.
Option 2. Distribution of the two-hour time is determined by the experimenter as one hour on
April 20 and one hour on April 24.
Please circle the option you would have chosen: Option 1 Option 2
Explain why you chose this option (Please be speciﬁc):
Second Session (First Task Session)
Thank you for coming back. Recall that the objective in the three task sessions (including
today’s session) is to complete a "two-hour task" that involves ﬁlling out some surveys. You have
the ﬂexibility to allocate the two-hour task time among the three task sessions scheduled for today,
April 24 (Monday) and April 27 (Thursday). To get paid, you have to come back for each of the
remaining two task sessions and sign a sign up sheet.
You will be paid a ﬁxed amount, $35, only if you complete this two-hour task and sign the sign
up sheet in all of the three task sessions. You can work on the task at most 90 minutes (1.5 hours)
on a given task session. This means that you will need to work on the task in at least two of the
three task sessions to complete the task. Note that even you allocate the two hours between two
of the three sessions, you have to come and sign the sign up sheet in the other session.
Given that you cannot work on the task more than 90 minutes in any of the task sessions, the
earliest session that you can complete the task is the next task session on April 24, Monday. You
can also complete the task in the third task session on April 27, Thursday.
If you complete it on April 24, then the $35 payoﬀ will be deposited to your ID account on
April 27. Note that you still need to come to the third task session and sign the sign up sheet on
April 27. If you complete it on April 27, then the $35 payoﬀ will be deposited to your ID account
on May 1.
Recall that you can allocate the two-hour task time however you like among the three task
sessions. Now please indicate your plan regarding the task by ﬁlling out the schedule below and
crossing appropriate boxes. These plans are not binding. Changing your plans will not aﬀect your
payoﬀ as long as you complete the task and sign the sign up sheet in all the three task sessions.
Now, you have 2 minutes to ﬁll out the schedule and answer the following question. Then we
will collect this document.AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS36
Now please ﬁll out the following schedule:
TODAY: ____ minutes;
APRIL 24: ____ minutes, Finish the task;
APRIL 27: ____ minutes, Finish the task;
Please answer the following question:
Are your today’s plan and the plan you submitted in the previous session diﬀerent (circle your
answer)? YES NO
If YES, please state the reason for the change in your plans?
Before we proceed to the “task” of ﬁlling out some surveys, we will conduct a simple auction.
You indicated your plan regarding the task. Now we will give you the following option: we ask
each of you to ﬁll out a “Bid form” that will be distributed to you momentarily. You will be bidding
for the right to be exempted from the requirement of completing the two-hour task. Your bid is
how much money you are willing to give up out your $35 ﬁxed earnings in order to be exempted
from the requirement of completing the two-hour task. The participant with the highest bid will
win the auction and will not have to complete the two-hour task. The highest bidder will pay the
second highest bid; hence his/her earnings will be $35 minus the second highest bid. You cannot
bid more than $35.
Example: Suppose you bid $20 and turns out that the highest bid from the other participants
is $17.5. You will win the auction and get paid $35-$17.5 = $17.5. Your payment date will be
based on the plan that you submitted above. If, for instance, you indicated in your plan (the one
you have ﬁlled today) that you would ﬁnish the task in the session on April 24, then $17.5 will be
deposited to your ID account on April 27. If you indicated that you would ﬁnish the task in the
session on April 27, then $17.5 will be deposited to your ID account on May 1. Note that even if
you win the auction, you still have to come to the next two sessions and sign the sign up sheet.
Otherwise, you will not be paid anything.
Now please indicate how much money you are willing to bid to be exempted from completing
the two-hour task. Write your bid on the Bid form within the next two minutes. Do not show your
bid to anybody. Your bids will be collected at the end of the two-minute period and the winner
will be announced. In case of a tie for the highest bid, we will roll a dice to determine the winner.
(Bids are collected and the winner is determined...)
Now, the time is —:— PM, You can start ﬁlling out the surveys. You can spend up to 90 minutes
on the surveys today. It is important that you do not engage in any activity (using the computer,
listening to your ipod, reading newspapers, etc.) during the time you spend on the surveys.
Please take your time to ﬁll out the surveys carefully. Note that you do not have to complete
all the surveys by the end of the two-hour period.
SURVEYS.................
After you are done with the surveys for the day, please ﬁll out the questionnaire below, leaveAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF TIME-INCONSISTENCY IN LONG-RUN PROJECTS37
everything on your desk, then come and sign the sign up sheet. We will note that ending time on
your forms.
End of Session 2 Questionnaire
Now, please answer the following questions before you leave:
1. Is the actual amount of time you have spent on the task today diﬀerent than your planned
allocation for today (the plan you submitted at the beginning of this session or the plan you
submitted in the previous session)?
Please circle your answer: YES NO
If YES, please give a brief explanation.
Third Session (Second Task Session)
Given the number of minutes you spent on the task in the second session (ﬁrst task session);
please indicate your plan for the remaining minutes to complete the two-hour task by ﬁlling out
the schedule below and crossing appropriate boxes. These plans are not binding. Changing your
plans will not aﬀect your payoﬀ as long as you complete the task and sign the sign up sheet in all
the three task sessions.
TODAY: ____ minutes, Finish the task;
APRIL 17: ____ minutes, Finish the task;
Now answer the following question:
QUESTION 1. Is your plan for today diﬀerent than the plan you submitted for today in the
previous session. Please circle your answer: YES NO




Please answer the following question after you are done with the questions & surveys for today
and before you leave:
QUESTION 2. Is the actual amount of time you spent on the task today diﬀerent than your
planned allocation for today (the plan you submitted at the beginning of this session or the plan
you submitted in the previous session). Please circle your answer: YES NO
If YES, please give a brief explanation.
Fourth Session (Third Task Session)
This is the ﬁnal session. Today you will spend the remaining minutes, if any, to complete the
two-hour requirement on the task.
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IF YOU HAVE ANY REMAINING MINUTES, START ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS
AND FILLING OUT THE SURVEYS NOW...
************************************************************************
Please answer the following questions before you leave and be precise as much as you can. Your
answers are very important for our analysis:
QUESTION 1: Your answer will not impact your payoﬀs. Suppose we maintained the require-
ment of coming to all the three task sessions and signing a sign up sheet. Suppose also that we
now give you the same 2-hour task as we did at the beginning of the experiment. Now, how would
have you allocated your time among the task sessions?
APRIL 20: ____ minutes;
APRIL 24: ____ minutes, Finish the task;
APRIL 27: ____ minutes, Finish the task;
If your plan now is diﬀerent than what you did in the actual experiment, what is the reason for
this diﬀerence? Please be speciﬁc.
QUESTION 2: Your answer will not impact your payoﬀs. Suppose we maintained the require-
ment of coming to all the three task sessions and signing a sign up sheet and gave you the choice
between the following two options:
Option 1: You get to determine the allocation of the two-hour time as you wish (as has been
the case for this experiment)
Option 2: Distribution of the two-hour time is determined by the experimenter as one hour on
April 20 and one hour on April 24.
Please circle the option you would have chosen: Option 1 Option 2
Explain why you chose this option (Please be speciﬁc):
QUIZ
Please circle T for true and F for false.
1. I can ﬁnish the whole task in one day. T F (False)
2. I can ﬁnish the task either in the second task session (April 24, Monday) or in the third task
session (April 27, Thursday). T F (True)
3. I will be paid as soon as I complete the task. T F (False)
4. My main decision is how to allocate the 2 hour task time among the three task sessions. T
F (True)
5. I have to ﬁnish the task, once I started it. T F (False)
6. I can earn partial payoﬀ by completing a portion of the task. T F (False)
7. I cannot work on the task more than 90 minutes (1.5 hour) in one task session. T F (True)
8. Although I come and sign the sign up sheet in all the three task sessions, I will not be paid
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9. Although I complete the two hour task, I will not be paid $35 if I do not come and sign the
sign up sheet in all three task sessions. T F (True)
APPENDIX B
A SAMPLE SURVEY
In the past three months, have you purchased products or services through the Internet, for
your personal use? __
• Yes • No
Please check the product or service category you most recently purchased.
• Books • Financial services • Computer equipment • CDs
• Other ___________________________________
When you began shopping on this occasion, were you: • Just surﬁng the net • Intending
to make a purchase.
• Other ___________________________________
How much did you spend on this transaction? • Less than $25 • $26-$50 • $51-$75
• $76-$100
• Other ___________________________________
Did you return the merchandise or cancel the service after you received it? • Yes • No
Did you contact the customer service department of this Internet retailer with a complaint or
problem? _• Yes • No
How much would you estimate you have spent with this Internet retailer in the past twelve
months? • less than $50 • $51-$100 • $101-$150 • more than $150
How many transactions have you made with this Internet retailer over the past 12 months? •
1 • 2 • 3 • 4
• Other ____________________